SONS OF DEWITT COLONY TEXAS Previous page 1 Evacuation of Goliad From Refugio by Hobart Huson After the column had proceeded about half a mile, two Mexicans were seen to come out of the timber a mile behind them---not in the front, from whence Fannin supposed them likely to appear. They halted on the edge of the prairie and reconnoitered for ten minutes, and then returned into the woods; soon after, they again returned, accompanied by four others and again disappeared." [Kennedy, Texas, 568] After the Texian column had advanced about four miles east of the Manehuila, the enemy's advance guard of cavalry made its appearance, emerging from the belt of timber that skirted the east side of the Manehuila Creek. [Kennedy, Texas, 568; Barnard, Journal, 17; Shackelford, Foote, II, 232; Bancroft, II, 228; Johnson, Texas and Texans, 1, 430; Duval, 40; Yoakum II, 92] Seeing this disposition of the enemy, Colonel Fannin ordered Captain Holland's and Captain Hurst's artillery companies to the rear, with instructions to begin a rear guard action, for the purpose of delaying the enemy and enabling the column to get to the protection of the timber of the Coleto, then about two miles distant. [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 27; Barnard, Journal, 17; Shackelford, Foote, II, 232] The artillery executed this order and fired several shots in the direction of the advancing enemy, but without any particular effect, as the shots fell short. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 232] The column, with the protection of the artillery, continued its advance. Colonel Fannin ordered his men to advance slowly, so as not to harass the jaded oxen; saying further that the party of the enemy in sight were come only to skirmish, in hopes of making some confusion, by which they might hope to gain plunder, that Colonel Horton, notified by the firing that the enemy were in sight, would immediately return and join the column and that the troops had only to keep themselves cool and they could easily foil such a party. The men all viewed the matter in the same light and marched onward, cool and deliberately, for about a mile further. [Barnard, Journal 17-18; Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 27; Ehrenberg, 153] About the time the artillery unlimbered and cleared for action, the four horsemen of the rear point came dashing up. Three of them were so terrified that they did not stop, but spurred and whipped their horses past the column and disappeared in the distance. The fourth horseman, Ehrenberg, stopped and took his place with his comrades. [Barnard, Journal, 17; Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 152-153] Ehrenberg confesses that despite the orders he and his companions had received to remain in the rear and keep a watchful eye on the adjacent timber, they, not seeing any enemy, had ridden along carelessly until accidentally they noticed a suspicious figure in the distance; but as it made no demonstration, they concluded it to be some inanimate object, without attempting any investigation. As the army was moving along at a snail's pace, they dismounted and let their horses graze, while they reclined on the ground contemplating the beauties of nature. Finally they were attracted by a dark mass moving on the edge of the forest, but they concluded that this was merely a herd of cattle being driven by settlers out of the Mexicans' way. Gradually they realized that the streak was the enemy horse; and they hastily took to the saddle to make their belated report, with the enemy only a short distance to their rear. [Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 152-153] Contemporaneously with the appearance of the Mexican cavalry (which was shortly followed by an infantry unit) in the west, the fringes of timber to the north and west became alive with the enemy. This presented an impressive and imposing spectacle to the Texians. Fannin ordered back the artillery and formed a hollow square, which moved slowly forward. [Boyle, 13 Q. 287; Shackelford, Foote, II, 232; Morgan, 5; Duval, 40] Seeing the purpose of the enemy was to cut him off from the timber, then scarcely a mile away, Fannin had his moving square make a left oblique in the direction of the nearest point of timber. The column then left the road and proceeded about three-quarters of a mile in the new direction; when the movement was brought to a halt by the enemy cavalry. [Boyle, 13 Q. 287; Johnson, Texas and Texans, 1, 430] While these Texian movements were taking place, the Mexican cavalry was approaching rapidly from the Manehuila Creek, and deployed into the open ground in platoons four deep. They immediately galloped after our troops, and when within a fourth of a mile of them, they separated and passed on in double files (one to the right and one to the left of the Texian square) having the Americans between them, until their van was half a mile ahead of the battalion, in the direction of Victoria; then they wheeled from both divisions and galloped to the center, until their ranks again met; their rear also closed in the same manner, and our friends found themselves surrounded, on all sides by the enemy. [Kennedy, Texas, 568; Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 27; Duval, 40; Barnard, Journal, 18; Urrea, Diario; Castaneda, Mexican Side, 223] Seeing himself thus enveloped, Fannin decided to prepare for battle, but desired to reach a commanding eminence about 400 or 500 yards distant before making his dispositions. As the column, in hollow square formation, began to move towards the elevated position, the ammunition wagon broke down; and Fannin decided that it would be impracticable to move the ammunition to the desired position and prepared to give battle on the very ground where chance caused him to be. [Bancroft, II, 229; Johnson, Texas and Texans, I, 430] Shackelford thus describes the position in which the Texians found themselves:
Urrea states that the artillery was in the center, but formation may be explained by the "hammer" movement which he described, whereby during one phase of the battle the artillery was shifted from one side of the square to the other, to meet attacks. [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 223] Such of the wagons and cart and draught animals as had gotten to this point were within the center of the "hollow rectangle," as Bancroft describes it. [Boyle, 13 Q. 287; Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 28] It might be here mentioned that Fannin had with him a number of Mexican prisoners, [Morgan; Duval, 44], which had been captured in a raid on the San Carlos ranch and, perhaps elsewhere, also some civilians and non-combatants, including at least one woman (Mrs. George W. Cash). [Kennedy, Texas, 571-573] There were also a few Mexicans employed to drive the steers. [Morgan] At the time the enemy first appeared in force, the wagon train was extended along the road, moving painfully along. In the excitement produced by the enemy, some of the steers sullied and refused to go either forward or backward, some were killed by the enemy, and some, perhaps, escaped. The result was that some of the carts and wagons were left stranded and were abandoned on the prairie. It is probable that the food wagon was among these, as it is inconceivable that Fannin or his responsible officers could have forgotten entirely to bring along anything to eat, as Davenport states. Dr. Barnard mentions that after the battle "we found from some unaccountable oversight we had left the provisions behind." [Barnard, Journal, 18] Morgan, who was in charge of the hospital wagon, relates that a Mexican was employed to drive that wagon, that when the order was given to halt, the Mexican abandoned the wagon and went off to the enemy; that the frightened steers, now driverless, headed for the Mexican lines, dragging the cart full of wounded men behind them; that luckily an enemy bullet killed one of the steers and stopped the stampede; but the hospital wagon remained some distance on the outside of the square. [Morgan, 5-7] Furthermore, in taking the steers from the artillery and wagons, no care was made to tie or secure them for probable future use. Some of the steers escaped and went to the Mexican lines. [Morgan, 5; Barnard, Journal, 18-19; Field, Three Years in Texas, 32, 51] Some, but not all of the remaining steers, were killed in the battle; but a few remained alive during the battle. These were killed by the Texians and their carcasses used for breastworks, as we shall hereafter see. [Boyle, 13 Q. 288] It will be remembered that Fannin turned off the road at an oblique angle to the north or northwest. Therefore, at the time of the battle his front was to the north or northwest, and his rear to the south or southeast. Unless this change of direction is noted, the details of some of the movements as described by surviving participants will be confusing. The oblong hollow square was composed as follows: [Bancroft, 11, 230; Shackelford, Foote, 11, 233; Duval, 41; Smith 23 Q. 278] On the front: The San Antonio, (New Orleans) Greys and the Red
Rovers, the latter being on the extreme right of that side.
The artillery was placed at the corners of the square, which was its normal position throughout the battle except that during periods it was shifted and maneuvered to meet certain contingencies. [Duval, 41; Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side] There were four artillery companies, or rather squads, which manned the guns, they being commanded, respectively, by Captains Holland, Hurst, Schrusnecki, or Petrewich, and Moore. [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 27-28; Barnard, Journal, 18. Davenport, 43 Q. 17] There were a number of men, soldiers and civilians, who were not attached to any particular organization, who were with the retreating army. Some of these now fought with such companies as they chose. Some formed themselves into an outpost at the stranded hospital wagon and specialized in sharpshooting. Among these were George W. Cash, Dr. Barnard, Baker, and Hews, who joined Morgan at the wagon. [Morgan, 6-7] The extra muskets, some of which had bayonets fixed to them, were distributed to the front ranks of the square, three or four extra guns were issued to each man. [Duval, 41] After the battle had gotten under way, three or four extra muskets were issued to every soldier. [Bancroft, 11, 230; Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 224] Colonel Fannin took a commanding position, directly in the rear of the right flank, one of the most dangerous spots. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 233] Like the others, he carried and used a rifle. Having made these dispositions, Colonel Fannin was ready to receive the enemy. As has been pointed out, Fannin's battlefield was about the worst place that any commander could select to fight a battle. There was no water, no natural cover, and every advantage of terrain favorable to the enemy. The prairie was covered with high grass, which was excellent concealment for the attacker, and which Urrea later used to good purpose. In justice to Fannin, he did not select this battleground; chance or Fate selected it for him; and no one realized the futility of the situation more than Fannin himself. Was he at fault at not attempting to fight his way through to the timber, only a mile away; or at least, in not fighting through to a better position only an eighth of a mile distant? It is interesting to note that but one officer, Dr. Barnard, and only one or two soldiers, who survived and left written accounts, have censured Fannin for fighting where Fate put him. Shackelford, Field and Holland, who were officers, and Duval, Boyle, arid other soldiers, who were men of broad discernment, consider the breaking down of the ammunition cart as an unfortunate circumstance, which obliged Fannin to accept the battle at that particular place. It is also interesting to note that most standard historians make no adverse comments on Fannin's judgment in failing to go on; although they are almost unanimous in condemning him for his failure to have kept moving in the first place. Ehrenberg is almost alone in contending that any protests were made to Fannin at this time and place against stopping there: He says that the San Antonio Greys repeatedly protested in vain that it was imperatively necessary for the woods to be gained and that if Fannin would not go, the Greys would march off alone. He indicates that Fannin called his captains together for consultation as to what should be done, but before they had reached a definite conclusion, the Mexicans began the attack and all had to defend themselves. [Bartholomae Ehrenberg, 153, 155. The battlefield is located in about the southwest corner of the Townsend, Hall, Haley and Crane Grant, in Goliad County sdct]
Dr. Barnard, the sole officer critic, avers
When the Mexican cavalry had completed its circle around Fannin's column, Horton's little advance guard was cut off from the main column. Horton has been censured for not cutting his way through the enemy and rejoining Fannin. Several of the San Antonio Greys, who were riding with him, dashed through the Mexican lines and rejoined their company. Urrea noted this incident as a brave act. [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 227] Shackelford and others exonerated Horton, and history has not condemned him. His comrades did expect that he would go to Victoria and bring them aid by the next morning. It is doubtful if there was any substantial aid which could have been found within a hundred miles. Though General Urrea had no artillery with him at the time, he decided not to wait for it to be brought up, but attack at once. The site of the battle being sonic distance from the timber behind which the Mexican army had been concentrating, some interval was required to form the Mexican battle line. In the meanwhile, the cavalry was circling the Texians, as has been described, bringing their march to practically a halt. Presently Mexican infantry advanced from the western timber line and deployed on the left and rear of the Texian square, while the cavalry took up a position to the front and right, thus completing the blocking of Fannin's progress until the main battle front could be formed. The main army was shortly seen emerging from the timber to the west and north and advancing rapidly. [Bancroft, II, 228-229; See Holzinger, Lamar Papers, I, 396-399] When the Mexicans had approached within half a mile of the Texian lines, they formed in three columns, one remaining stationary, the other two marching parallel, one to the Texians right, the other to the Texians left. When the two marching columns had covered the Texian flanks and were opposite to each other, they suddenly changed direction to face the square, and the three columns, with trumpets braying and pennons flying, charged the Texian front and flanks simultaneously, while the Mexican cavalry vigorously charged the rear. [Duval, 41; Urrea, Diario] Colonel Fannin ordered that all fire be withheld until the command to fire was given. The order was obeyed. Bullets from the attacking force began to reach the Texian lines, but the discipline and restraint of the troops was splendid. Captain Shackelford, after the second enemy volley ordered all ranks of his company to sit down until the command to fire was given. This example was quickly followed by all excepting the artillerists and Colonel Fannin himself, who is described by all writers as having been splendidly brave and cool. The third enemy volley wounded several Texians, including Colonel Fannin. The Colonel still stood erect, rifle in hand, giving orders, "Not to fire yet," in a calm and decided manner. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 223] Finally the artillerists, who were in exposed positions, requested that the artillery be permitted to open fire. The order was given. The cannons were loaded with cannisters of musket balls, the howitzer with grist. The fire wrought havoc in the enemy ranks, but still they came on. The wind was blowing slightly from the northeast and the smoke from the cannon furnished a screen to the enemy of which they took advantage. [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 28] When the enemy had advanced within about a hundred yards of the square, Fannin gave the long awaited order to fire. The blast from the Texian rifles and artillery was terrific and did murderous execution, but still the Mexicans came on. Their foremost ranks were in actual contact with the bayonets of the Texians at several places of the square. But the fire at close quarters was so rapid and destructive (the Texians making good use of the extra muskets) that before long the enemy fell back in confusion, but not in rout, leaving the ground covered in places with horses and dead men. [Duval, 41] The cavalry charge on the rear of the square resulted in a hard and bitter fight. Duval, whose brother's company defended that side, states, "they nearly succeeded in breaking our lines at several places, and certainly they would have done so had we not taken the precaution of arming all in the front ranks with the bayonet and musket." At one time it was almost a hand to hand fight between the cavalry and our front rank, but the two files in the rear poured such a continuous fire upon the advancing columns that they were finally driven back in disorder. [Duval, 42; Shackelford, Foote, II, 234] The artillery was skillfully and effectively handled-being suddenly wheeled or shifted to a threatened point, and delivering well timed, powerful fire at critical moments. As will be seen from Urrea's description of the movements, the Texian artillery was shifted from flank to flank and from front to rear, and massed, after which it was returned to pivot the corners of the square. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 234; Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 224-225] General Urrea describes his initial battle formation as follows: He overtook Fannin at about 1:30 P. M., and succeeded in cutting off the latter's retreat with his cavalry. He then ordered Colonel Juan Morales to charge the Texian left with the rifle companies. Shackelford states that these troops were the celebrated Tampico Permanent Regiment, of which Santa Anna said, "They were the best troops in the world. [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 223-224; Shackelford, Foote, II, 233; Johnson, and Texans, 431] The grenadiers and the first regiment of San Luis, under immediate command of Urrea himself, charged the right. The remainder of the battalion of Jimenez, and some other companies under Colonel Salas formed itself into a column and charged the front; while the cavalry, commanded by Colonel Gabriel Nunez, attempted to surprise the Texian rear. [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 223, 224; Bancroft, II, 229-30] As Urrea's account agrees in most details with Texian accounts, we will give it in full.
Shackelford says that after the infantry charge had been repulsed, the enemy
"The sun was going down and our munitions would soon give out," continues Urrea.
The action commenced about 1:30 in the afternoon and continued without intermission until after sunset. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 234; Johnson, Texas and Texans, I, 431; Bancroft, II, 231; Barnard's Journal 18; Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 29; Bartolomae, Ehrenberg, 18] Duval states that the action was concluded at sunset by a sortie by the Texians on the dismounted cavalry. "They hastily remounted and fell back to the timber to our left." [Duval, 44] After the Mexicans had definitely retired from the field, the Texians broke the battle formation which they had so gallantly, maintained during that long afternoon and gathered in the center of the square to rest and take inventory. Holland states, "It was a sorry sight to see our small circle; had become muddy with blood; Colonel Fannin had been so badly wounded at the first or second fire so as to disable him." [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 29] Fannin received three wounds, one slight, the others severe; but, according to all accounts, he continued at his post throughout the battle proved himself a brave and gallant soldier. After the excitement of battle had subsided, his wounds began to pain him. [Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 157, Morgan, 8] The Texian losses at the end of the regular battle and before the sniping began, were 10 killed, several mortally wounded, and 60-70 badly wounded. Many others were slightly wounded. [Bancroft, II, 231; Duval, 46] In fact, there was hardly a Texian who had not received some scratch or wound. [Duval, 46] Among the killed were Lieutenant George McKnight, of Westover's company, Captain H. Francis Petrussewicz, of the artillery, William Quinn, Alfred Dorsey, John Kelly, Conrad Eigenauer, John Jackson, William H. Mann, William F. Savage, and Archibald Swards. Among the wounded, besides Colonel Fannin, were Captain Fraser, of the Refugio Militia, Captain Burr H. Duval, Captain John Sowers Brooks, Andrew Boyle, of Westover's company, and George W. Cash, the surveyor. All accounts agree that the scene in the Texian camp was most pitiful and distressing now that the din of battle had subsided. The Texians were entirely without water and food. The wounded were given attention by the doctors Barnard, Shackelford, Field, Ferguson and Hale; but their piteous cries for water and delirious shrieks were heartrending and depressing. A discussion was commenced as to the course now to be taken, but it was cut short by bullets of snipers which began to crash into the camp, frequently finding their mark. Shortly after the Mexican army had retired to their camps, Urrea bethought himself of a means by which he might further damage or at least harass his wearied and bleeding foe. He had with his army about a hundred excellent marksmen in the persons of the Cerise Indians of the Rio Grande. [Davenport, 43 Q. 33; Duval, 43; Bancroft, II, 231] Some accounts state that these marksmen were the same Yucatan or Campeche Indians who had suffered so dreadfully at Refugio. [Kennedy, Texas, 570; Johnson, 431; Yoakum, II, 93] At any rate, Urrea had these Indians slip through the tall grass and take positions close to the Texian line, from which they could pick off such Texians as presented a good target. These marksmen got within thirty paces of the lines and began to do effective execution. Most accounts state that the Texians suffered more losses from snipers than they did during the afternoon's battle. An account states that they killed 4 Texans and wounded 50 within the space of an hour. [Kennedy, Texas, 571] It was dark and the Texians could not see their concealed foeman. Finally they solved the problem. They posted counter snipers, who remained quiet until they saw the flashes of the Indian's guns; then they would fire at the point where the flash had been seen. After a while the Mexican snipers were definitely worsted and withdrew. The bodies of many of them were found in the grass the next morning. [Kennedy, Texas, 571; Duval, 43; Yoakum, Il, 93; Bancroft, II, 231] The sniping ended, but the resourceful Urrea was determined that his foeman should have no rest or sleep during the night. He kept small parties active throughout the night "harassing the enemy and keeping it awake with false bugle-calls." All night the bugles shrieked the "Centinelo Alerto," but that was not the cause of the Texians' getting no rest. Before taking up the plans and preparations of Fannins men, we will see how Urrea disposed of his forces during the night. He states, "I placed the infantry a little more than 200 paces from the enemy, protected from their rifles by a gentle slope. I detailed cavalry and infantry pickets to points from which they could observe the enemy. I moved the wounded to the woods which the enemy had tried to take possession of when I overtook it, and which was situated to the rear of our infantry. During the night I closed the circle formed by our advance guards and moved our scouts forward until they could observe the slightest movement in the other camp, . . . harassing the enemy and keeping it awake with false bugle calls. I also visited our outposts." [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 227] The Mexican army was posted in three detachments or sections around the Texians' camp. The first was placed towards Goliad; the second between the Texians and Victoria; and the third to the left, and equally far from the other two so that they formed a triangle. Ehrenberg states, "Their signals indicated to us their exact positions. Under these circumstances it was impossible for us to retreat without being noticed. [Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 158] The detachments appear to have been placed about a quarter of a mile from each side of the Texian camp. [Kennedy, Texas, 571] The Mexicans rested on their arms all night. In addition to the contingents guarding against escape of Fannin, the Mexicans appear to have had their main camp in the woods to the north of the Texians, where large reserves were being rested and refreshed for the next morning's expected battle. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 236-237] During the night reinforcements and several pieces of artillery were moved up from Goliad. In Fannin's camp there was a different scene. Minds were confused as to the best course to take. Despite their losses, the Texians really felt that they had been the victors and had given the foe a good beating. Fannin is said to have stated, "We beat them today and we can do it again tomorrow." Despite his wounds, which were painful, he was collected and in good spirits. He offered "his good leg" to one of the privates for "a pillow." There was considerable expectancy that Colonel Horton would be on hand early the next morning with reinforcements. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 237; Kennedy, Texas, 572] A survey, however, indicated that the ammunition was low, and it was estimated that not enough remained to see them through another such battle. [Duval, 47; Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 29] Also, there was absolutely no water, and this was not only imperatively needed for the wounded and the well also, but was required to keep the artillery in action. The artillery had performed beautifully during the first part of the battle; but when the big guns got hot, they could not be used again until they cooled. If they were to be depended upon water was required to sponge them when they got hot. [Bancroft, lI, 230] The casualty list among the artillerists had been heavy. These men had been compelled to expose themselves, and Urrea had no doubt seen to it that his marksmen had given special attention to their elimination. One artillery captain was dead. [Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 157; Morgan, 8; Barnard, Journal, 18] Towards the end of the battle there had not been enough experienced men to man the guns. Lieutenant Gates, of Westover's company, had taken over one of the cannons, and the San Antonio Greys had manned one or more of the others. [Field, Three Years in Texas, 57] It was doubtful whether the artillery would be of much value in a second day's battle." [Shackelford, Foote, II, 237] The question of abandoning the camp and fighting their way to the timber was given considerable discussion. Duval relates,
The San Antonio Greys appear to have revived their original idea of cutting their own way through the enemy to the woods if the rest would not go, but finally they yielded to the pleas of their wounded comrades and decided to wait until daylight before making their decision. [Bartholomae, Ehrenberg, 158-161; Barnard, Journal, 19] Holland states,
While the matter of the wounded men controlled the decision to remain and fight, there were also other considerations. It was evident that if a retreat was to be successful, the artillery, wagons, and most of the baggage and ammunition, as well as the wounded, would have to be left behind, because there was no motive power available with which to move the carts. Dr. Field states,
Shackelford's story is about the same as Fields'. [Shackelford, Foote, II, 237] Morgan states,
It seems that these and all wounded oxen were thereafter killed, either by the Texians or by sharpshooters detailed by Urrea for the purpose, and their carcasses used for entrenchments. [Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, Mexican Side, 227] The night was dark as pitch, and the weather was threatening. A cold norther made its appearance, and a misty fog and drizzling rain began to fall. [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 29] These adverse conditions continued and worsened throughout the night. No fire was attempted and no light was made, as it was feared that the silhouetted forms of the Texians would become immediate targets for the enemy pickets lurking near. Thus throughout the night the wounded could receive no surgical aid, and whatever was done for them was by sense of touch only. [Barnard, Journal, 19]. As the night grew on, the men and especially the wounded were tortured by lack of water. Some of the soldiers thought they might find water at shallow level and began digging for it, without success. [Boyle, 13 Q. 258] It having been decided to remain where they were orders were given to begin work entrenching and erecting barricades and breastworks. Dr. Barnard relates:
Piled up on the redoubt were all of the available wagons, carts, baggage, and carcasses of dead horses and oxen. The surviving animals were killed and their carcasses used as bastions. [Boyle, 13 Q. 258; Barnard, Journal, 19; Kennedy, Texas, 571; Urrea, Diario, Castaneda, 227] The hungry and thirsty men worked all night in the dark and drizzle, and by dawn had completed their fortifications. [Barnard, Journal, 19; Kennedy, Texas, 571; Duval, 46; Field, 51] The cannon were once more set up in the corners of the reduced square. [Holland, Huson, Reporting Texas, 30] In this work even badly wounded men and the officers and doctors had a full share. [Barnard, Journal, 19] The Texians got no rest, as, by the time they had finished this makeshift fortification, the Mexican army was in motion ready to resume the battle. The courage and discipline of the Texians was still excellent. Only two cases of cowardice are recorded. These two men when the battle began the previous day had hid themselves under wagons and covered themselves with blankets. [Kennedy, Texas, 571] Some time during the night three Texians left the barricade with the view of escaping through the Mexican lines. Shortly thereafter three. volleys were heard in the direction which they had taken, and their comrades in the trenches knew the three quasi-deserters had failed to get through. [Duval, 47 sdct] During the time the entrenching was in progress, preparations were made to guard against a night raid by Mexican cavalry. Each man was issued two or more good muskets, one with bayonet attached. Those who rested from the digging stood guard while the others labored. Instructions were given, in case of attack, to kneel on one knee behind the embankment with one musket in the hands and braced against the knee, and with the other musket leaning against the embankment. The orders were to let the enemy come close enough so as to be sure to kill one out of each fire for every man, and then to use the bayonet. Boyle [Morgan] says, "We remained in the position all night." [Morgan, 9-10] Urrea states,
Although the Texians had labored hard on the entrenchments none of them appear to have placed much value or reliance on them. [Duval, 46-47] However, as soon as Colonel Fannin saw the artillery he knew that the fate of the engagement was determined; and he called a consultation of officers," amid the cries of our wounded that he would surrender, and thus procure water for their parched tongues." [Kennedy, Texas, 571-573] Next page 3 Surrender of Fannin Independence-Index |
